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What kind of foreign policy do populists execute once in power? Based on
the existing literature, we conceptualize populism as a set of ideas whose
two core elements are anti-elitism and antipluralism. From this we develop
a set of hypotheses regarding both substantive aspects of foreign policy
as well as foreign policy–making processes of populist leaders in govern-
ment. An analysis of Indian PrimeMinister NarendraModi’s foreign policy
record serves as a first plausibility probe of our hypotheses. We find that
our concept of populism carries most explanatory value in the procedural
aspects of foreign policy making as well as in its communication, less so in
those aspects relating to the goals or substance of foreign policy. Whereas
foreign policy under Modi’s populist leadership is highly centralized and
personalized, the traditional foreign policy establishment, including most
notably the Ministry of External Affairs, has lost some of its previous au-
thority. Engaging the Indian diaspora abroad emerged as another char-
acteristic of populist foreign policy making. By contrast, the case of India
does not confirm our hypothesis regarding a preference of bilateralism
over multilateralism, nor does populism necessarily preclude investing in
global public goods.
Introduction
What kind of foreign policy will populists pursue once they come to power and
form governments? This question is increasingly pressing against the backdrop of
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the ascent to power of populists in a range of countries. Nonetheless, the topic
of “populist” foreign policy has remained surprisingly understudied. Recent media
contributions are obviously grappling with the populist elements in US President
Donald Trump’s foreign policy, but more systematic, theory-driven analyses of the
implications of populists in power for a country’s foreign policy are lacking. This
is surprising since, in many parts of the world, populism has emerged as a reac-
tion to some elements of globalization (Liang 2007, 8–10; Chryssogelos 2017) or,
in the West, to the perceived growing influence of international institutions and
“international bureaucracies” (Zürn 2004, 285). At the same time, the concept of
populism is highly contested, thereby forcing us to ask if there actually is anything
like a specifically “populist” foreign policy and, if so, what its features might be.
To address this question, we proceed as follows: first, based on the extensive liter-
ature on the conceptualization and definition of populism, we outline what our un-
derstanding of populism is—a set of ideas whose two core elements are anti-elitism
and antipluralism. In a second step, we derive a range of hypotheses on how the rise
to power of populist forces will likely affect different aspects of a country’s foreign
policy. We then carry out a first plausibility probe of our hypotheses (Eckstein 1975,
108–13), and we choose the case of India for our empirical assessment.
There are several reasons why India is an ideal case for this exercise. With the
electoral victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)1 in 2014 and the inauguration
of Narendra Modi as India’s prime minister, we saw the rise to power of a genuinely
populist leader. A period of almost four years in government (2014–18) is long
enough to allow us to distinguish some patterns in foreign policy under Modi’s
government. Cases with a shorter time frame, such as President Rodrigo Duterte
of the Philippines, would be less useful. Moreover, as will be illustrated below, In-
dia’s previous coalition governments under the leadership of Prime Minister Man-
mohan Singh (2004–14) of the Indian National Congress (INC or Congress) do
not count as populist according to our definition and can therefore be used as a
point of reference to assess potential shifts toward a populist foreign policy under
Modi. This clear-cut transition from a nonpopulist to a populist leader makes In-
dia a more useful case as compared to other cases in which the transition toward
populism was more gradual—think of Turkey, where, according to our definition,
Erdog˘an became populist over time by gradually adding ever stronger antipluralist
elements to his anti-elitist rhetoric. Moreover, comparisons between Modi’s foreign
policy and that of the BJP-led government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1998–2004) will
allow us to distinguish between the populist elements in Modi’s foreign policy and
the broader ideological features related to the BJP’s Hindu nationalist ideology. Fi-
nally, the scant literature on populism and foreign policy so far almost exclusively
deals with cases from Europe and the Americas. The case of India thus highlights
populism’s salience globally and promises to broaden our understanding of the
phenomenon. Based on the results of our plausibility probe, the final section of
the paper suggests some refinements to our hypotheses and outlines avenues for
further research.
The Concept of Populism
“Populism” is a highly contested concept whose usefulness as an analytical category
has been repeatedly called into question (Laclau 2007, 3; Mudde and Kaltwasser
2017, 2–5). Past studies of populism from the 1960s–1980s, many of them based
on Latin American cases, tended to conceptualize populism in economic-structuralist
terms, assuming a connection between delayed dependent development, certain
social constituencies (e.g., organized workers), and specific distributive policies
(for an overview, see Weyland 2001, 4–9). The emergence of personalistic populist
1
The BJP won 51.7 percent of the seats in the lower house of the Indian Parliament.
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leaders who did not pursue such “irresponsible” economic policies ultimately called
into question such definitions (Roberts 1995). Scholars like Weyland (2001, 14, em-
phasis added) instead chose to define populism as a “political strategy through which
a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, un-
mediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized
followers.” This definition has several elements in common with the understanding
of populism adopted in this article. Yet, by assuming the existence of unorganized
masses and excluding institutionalized populist parties, it is rather narrow, which
makes it difficult to apply to more recent cases such as European right-wing pop-
ulist parties. It also risks equating populism with demagoguery, thereby leading to
a loss of conceptual clarity (Aslanidis 2016, 96). Authors like Moffitt and Tormey
(2014, 391–93) instead understand populism as a political style and inductively iden-
tify its core elements: an appeal to “the people”; a perception and a performance
(Moffitt 2015) of crisis, breakdown, and threat; and “bad manners.” This approach
has the advantage of including both left- and right-wing populists and of capturing
interesting facets of the political style and communication of contemporary populist
leaders like Trump or Duterte, but it tends to downplay the ideational elements that
are common to populists across the political spectrum.
Some more recent definitions of populism, which have substantially shaped the
current debate, capture the commonalities of populist movements and leaders
across the political spectrum by conceptualizing populism as a “thin-centred ideol-
ogy” (Mudde 2004, 544). For the purpose of developing hypotheses on the impact
of populism on foreign policy, such a focus on the essential ideational underpin-
nings of populism—as opposed to specific domestic economic policies, strategic
mobilization features, or stylistic elements of domestic politics—is particularly use-
ful. In fact, as we will see, such sets of ideas will allow us to develop some more
specific expectations for the field of foreign policy.
Among the definitions of populism that focus on its ideational dimension, those
by Mudde (2004; 2016) and Müller (2016) are widespread and largely overlapping,
and they build upon several aspects of the broader literature mentioned above.
We stick to the leaner conceptualization provided by Müller as it only encompasses
two core dimensions, but we also relate it to Mudde’s work. Populism, according
to Müller, entails two necessary and jointly sufficient dimensions: anti-elitism and
antipluralism. By understanding populism as a “thin” ideology, such a conceptual-
ization allows us to identify the commonalities of populist movements and leaders
across the political spectrum. In fact, the two basic elements of anti-elitism and an-
tipluralism can and typically do coexist with other, “thicker” ideological elements
such as socialism or, as we will see for the case of India, HIndu nationalism.
The first essential feature of populists is their criticism of elites in highly moralis-
tic terms. As Mudde (2016, 26) puts it, populism conjures up a separation of society
into “two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt
elite.’” The moralistic dimension of populist discourse reflects a tendency to depict
the will of the “people” as good and elites as “evil” (Mudde 2004, 543). Relatedly,
populists often portray themselves or the “people” as victims—and they sometimes
continue to do so even after they come to power. In such a Manichean imaginary,
“majorities act as mistreated minorities” (Müller 2016, 42), and enemy images are
kept alive so that in some cases “governing [is] a permanent campaign” (43). De-
pending on the thick ideology espoused by different populists, the “elites” can be
representatives of the political establishment (think of Trump’s attack on “Wash-
ington” in his inauguration speech), of a domestic oligarchy (Thaksin’s criticism
of the aristocratic network Amaat in Thailand), but also the EU bureaucracy (for
right-wing populist parties in Europe) or transnational capital (for left-wing Latin
American populists). Disregard for the elite typically is underlined by claims to the
need for and promise of a “‘rupture’ with the existing unjust order” (Panizza and
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Miorelli 2009, 40; emphasis in the original), as exemplified by Trump’s campaign
promise to “drain the swamp.”
The second core feature of populism, antipluralism, refers to the fact that
populist leaders claim to speak in the name of the people and that “they,
and they alone, represent the people” (Müller 2016, 3). Discerning the “righ-
teous and morally pure” (3) people routinely excludes certain sections of the
population from this definition. This does not mean that antipluralism always coin-
cides with nativism (Mudde 2007, 13–14). Left-wing populists usually will not pur-
sue an ethnonationalist agenda. However, once they claim that only they can speak
for the true people, this automatically excludes political opponents and their con-
stituencies. In its most extreme form, such “denial of diversity effectively amounts
to denying the status of certain citizens as free and equal. These citizens might
not be excluded officially, but the public legitimacy of their individual values, ideas
of what makes for the good life, and even material interests are effectively called
into question” (Müller 2016, 82). The tendency to denigrate political competitors,
arguing that they “might not be part of the proper people to begin with” (20),
relates to another feature of populism: Populists typically regard intermediating
institutions—from parliament to courts and particularly the media—with skepti-
cism, as such institutions stand in the way between the true representative and his
or her people. In fact, they “assume that ‘the people’ can . . . issue something like an
imperative mandate that tells politicians exactly what they have to do when in gov-
ernment” (31). Naturally, new communication media allowing for direct channels
between the leader and the people are endorsed enthusiastically by populists, while
traditional media “are accused . . . of ‘mediating’ [and thereby] distorting political
reality” (35)—think of Italian Beppe Grillo’s use of his blog to directly learn about
the “people’s” wishes.
Developing Hypotheses on Populism and Foreign Policy
So far, little attention has been paid to populists’ foreign policy. Two notable ex-
ceptions are Chryssogelos (2017) and Verbeek and Zaslove (2017). Both argue,
as we do, in favor of an understanding of populism as a thin ideology. However,
Chryssogelos (2017) does not go so far as to explicitly theorize populist foreign
policy and empirically assess the validity of his thoughts. By contrast, Verbeek and
Zaslove (2017) make the most systematic attempt so far at developing hypotheses
on the foreign-policy positions of populist parties, arguing that populists’ politi-
cal orientation—that is, the “thick ideology” they relate to—ultimately shapes their
specific foreign-policy preferences, as well as their more or less isolationist versus
cosmopolitan attitude. However, they find it difficult to identify common traits of a
truly “populist” foreign policy, and, importantly, they refrain from focusing on pop-
ulists in power. The rest of the literature on populism and foreign policy is mostly
based on insights from single case studies and also has a clearly Eurocentric or
“Western” bias.2 Nevertheless, some studies from the field of foreign policy analysis
offer interesting insights into anti-elitist actors and their foreign policy preferences
(e.g., Mead 2011; Rathbun 2013) or on populist radical right parties and their in-
fluence on foreign policy as junior coalition partners (e.g., Verbeek and Zaslove
2015).
Instead of trying to gain insights from idiosyncratic cases, we chose to deductively
develop hypotheses on the basis of the ideational features of populism outlined
above. We specifically focus on the foreign policy pursued by populists in power.
The underlying assumption is that populists in power will pursue policies that re-
flect their mandate across a range of issue areas, including foreign policy. Since
we aim to identify potential features of populist foreign policy in a general sense,
2
See Liang (2007) and Balfour et al. (2016). One notable exception is Dodson and Dorraj (2008).
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independent of the underlying thick ideology, we develop our hypotheses based on
the two core dimensions of anti-elitism and antipluralism. In our plausibility probe
for the Indian case, we will explore to what extent such hypotheses on the impact of
populism as a thin ideology find confirmation and to what extent the thick ideology
of Hindu nationalism needs to be taken into account as an explanatory factor. The
introduction of a relatively high number of hypotheses is related to the exploratory
character of this study, which should be understood as a first effort at theorizing
populist foreign policy. A plausibility probe for a large number of hypotheses is
the most useful way to approach a so far understudied topic and to identify which
avenues for further research and theorizing are the most promising.
Our first hypothesis relates populists’ antipluralist and anti-elitist claim of repre-
senting the people to their foreign-policy engagement on global governance issues.
Populists in power will likely use a rhetoric that explicitly refers to the “popular will”
and directly links their foreign policy with an engagement for “the people.” This
peculiar insistence on the will of the people can be expected to entail a particularly
strong prioritization of the (narrowly understood) “national interest” (Chryssogelos
2017). Generally speaking, this might, in turn, involve a decreased readiness to con-
tribute to the provision of global public goods, which by definition implies also
considering the well-being of persons beyond one’s own narrow community or con-
stituency. Such measures entail high costs, while their benefits may not be of imme-
diate relevance to “the people” defined in anti-elitist and antipluralist terms. This
can lead to a limited willingness to engage in issue areas of global governance that
potentially involve high spending of blood and treasure or costs for economic de-
velopment, for example climate change mitigation, conflict management, or peace-
keeping. In other fields, such as trade liberalization, the interpretation provided by
populist leaders will codepend on their parties’ underlying thick ideologies; hence,
for example, not all populists will necessarily be protectionists. Our first hypothesis
therefore suggests that populists in power will be less likely to make concessions on global
governance issues that entail high costs of blood and treasure as compared to nonpopulist
governments.
Our second hypothesis refers to international institution building and multilat-
eralism, which can be expected to be particularly difficult to engage in for pop-
ulists in power. For one, international institutions—like intermediate institutions
domestically—stand in the way between the populist leader and his or her people
by introducing rules and potentially constraining his or her room to maneuver.
As displayed by populist parties in Eastern and Southern Europe, populists often
regard international organizations as a product of a transnational elite and, relat-
edly, as a threat to “the people” and to national sovereignty. By contrast, bilateral
leader-level agreements, which allow the leader to directly convey the supposed will
of the people and also clearly exhibit the leader’s claim for status as the sole le-
gitimate representative of “the real people,” can be expected to be the preferred
modus operandi for populists in power. The insistence on the defense of national
sovereignty and the claim of exclusive representation may also complicate interna-
tional institution building. We can therefore hypothesize (second) that populists in power
are likely to privilege bilateralism over multilateralism.
While populists primarily identify the people in domestic terms, it is worthwhile
exploring if populists extend this essential notion beyond their nation’s borders.
Populists in power may be induced to translate their domestically successful at-
tachment and habitual reference to the “people” to foreign affairs by way of ex-
panding their notion of the very people they claim to represent. And if they un-
derstood the “people” in broader transnational terms, this would certainly have an
impact on their foreign policy. Anecdotal evidence suggests that populists sometime
speak to a transnational constituency that involves the diaspora population. Presi-
dent Erdog˘an’s claim to represent supposedly oppressed people of Turkish descent
fromWestern Europe to China is illustrative. Directly addressing the diaspora might
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reflect populists’ disregard for intermediary institutions that separate them from
the people. It might also be an expression of populists’ attempts to make foreign
policy look less elitist. While the diaspora can be expected to be a preferred transna-
tional extension of the people for populists with a nationalist ideological back-
ground, there may be different understandings of a transnational “people” asso-
ciated with a leftist or anti-imperialist thick ideology. In fact, some populist leaders
have aimed to speak for a broader transnational people as opposed to some op-
pressing power or elite in world politics (Chryssogelos 2017). We therefore propose
the explorative hypothesis that populists in power will be more likely than their nonpop-
ulist counterparts to develop a transnational understanding of their “people” and to engage
such a transnational audience in their foreign policy (third hypothesis).
We argue that populism can also be expected to have an impact on the very way in
which foreign policy is made. While we have generally seen a growing role of heads
of state and government in foreign policy in recent years,3 populists’ tendency to
portray a singular leader as the embodiment of the people suggests an even more
centralized decision-making process with fewer opportunities for the expression of a
plurality of alternative perspectives in foreign policy making than elsewhere. More-
over, we can expect populists in government to be skeptical of the established elite
in the field of foreign policy: diplomats. Due to its professional formation and the
elitist traditions attached to it, the diplomatic corps will likely appear suspicious to
a populist leader and his followers. As an illustration, consider that under President
Trump an unprecedented number of senior positions within the State Department
have remained vacant, and Secretary of State Tillerson himself was a novice with
a colossal budget cut on his immediate agenda. We can thus expect populists in
power to surround themselves with other kinds of experts and possibly also to break
established conventions of diplomatic etiquette. We therefore hypothesize (fourth) that
the decision-making process in the foreign policy of populists in power will be more centralized
and personalistic with fewer formalized opportunities for alternative viewpoints than under a
nonpopulist leadership.
Finally, we can expect the “true people” as the exclusive reference combined
with populists’ disregard for established intermediary institutions—the press, parlia-
ment, or the judiciary—to precipitate creativity in populists’ adoption of new ways
for involving their constituency, also on foreign policy matters. New communication
technology allows populists to devise novel forms of direct communication, thereby
(at least rhetorically) making foreign policy less elitist. Our fifth hypothesis thus sug-
gests that populist in power will be more likely to adopt unconventional ways of directly relating
their foreign policy to “the people,” including, in particular, via social media.
Populism in India
Before moving on to our plausibility probe of the five hypotheses on populist for-
eign policy, in this section we provide a recapitulation of the salience and meanings
of populism in the political history of independent India. In fact, the term pop-
ulism has a long history in the Indian context, often denoting the distribution of
economic benefits to various subgroups of the electorate.4 Typically, historians and
political scientists consider two kinds of political forces to be populist: on the na-
tional level, Indira Gandhi’s first and second term as prime minister and, on the
regional level, movements and parties representing particular linguistic and caste
groups (Subramanian 2007).5 Although regional populism incorporates integral
3
See, for instance, Cooper, Heine, and Thakur (2013).
4
On the “populism” of other Indian politicians, see Subramanian (2007, 82) and Jaffrelot and Tillin (2017). For
“populist strategies” adopted by the BJP in the 1980s and early 90s, see in particular Jaffrelot (1996).
5
Populism on the regional level first emerged in competition to Indira Gandhi’s Congress (Jaffrelot and Tillin 2017,
189; Kenny 2017, chapter 6; Hansen 1999, chapter 4).
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elements of the concept of populism employed in this article, it is of lesser im-
portance to our analysis for two reasons. First, albeit frequently “in power” on the
national level through coalition politics from the late 1980s onward, regional par-
ties affected foreign policy only sporadically. Second, whereas regional populists
have employed an anti-elitist, pro-poor discourse, in national politics they remain
powerful voices in defense of pluralism, rather than the opposite.
Thus, more relevant for the purpose of this paper is Indira Gandhi’s populism
on the national stage, which vividly employed a strategy of anti-elitism. Paradoxi-
cally, the daughter of India’s founding father and first prime minister Jawaharlal
Nehru managed to portray herself as anti-elitist by delegitimizing the establishment
of her own party and claiming not only to represent the people but even to person-
ify the Indian nation itself (Guha 2007, 548). In her speeches, the “old” Congress
was portrayed as “conservative elements” in thrall to “vested interests,” whereas her
platform was committed to the poor (447). Placing loyal individuals in positions of
authority and eroding party as well as state institutions to the benefit of her own
authority were the hallmarks of Indira Gandhi’s rule from the split of Congress to
the proclamation of emergency in 1975—a measure she justified as a “necessary re-
sponse to the deep and widespread conspiracy which has been brewing ever since
I began to introduce certain progressive measures of benefit to the common man
and woman of India” (quoted in Guha 2007, 493).
However, whereas Indira Gandhi exhibited important elements of populism, an-
tipluralism was not part of her political strategy. To the contrary, by promoting
clientelism and personal loyalty over party structure and in order to expand her
electoral base, Indira Gandhi’s leadership is widely regarded as contributing to the
rise of caste-, tribal-, or religious-based politics in the 1980s (Hansen 1999, 136,
150). And albeit presiding over a traumatic and violent campaign against militant
Sikhs pressing for self-rule in 1984, Indira Gandhi, like her father, was “genuinely
non-parochial, seeking to represent all Indians, regardless of their gender or class,
or religious and linguistic affiliation” (Guha 2007, 573).
Likewise, although the two most recent Congress-led governments under Man-
mohan Singh were sometimes dubbed “populist” in the Indian discourse, they
neither reflected Indira Gandhi’s anti-elitism and centralization of leadership nor
antipluralism. Quite to the contrary, the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty at the helm of
the Congress party was the embodiment of India’s political elite. Moreover, the
Congress rather consistently stuck to the long-held principles of secularism and plu-
ralism. Although episodes of religious violence took place also in the years 2004–14,
the government and its supporters did not systematically try to reshape the under-
standing of the Indian nation by redefining the Indian “people” through the exclu-
sion of specific groups.
By contrast, the Indian government under Prime Minister Modi can be consid-
ered populist as it clearly entails both constitutive dimensions of populism: anti-
elitism and antipluralism. The electoral victory of the BJP in 2014 came after a
series of corruption scandals that tainted the image of the INC. The desire to re-
place corrupt elites and to put an end to India’s dynastic politics was a core ele-
ment in Modi’s electoral success. Modi himself—the son of a tea-seller—embodied
such anti-elitism. For instance, mocking the INC candidate Rahul Gandhi, the scion
of the Gandhi-Nehru family, as a “prince” was a common feature during his cam-
paign. In their analysis of the 2014 national election campaign, Chakravartty and
Roy (2015, 315) find that the BJP media team cultivated the party’s role as an un-
derdog against the hereditary and corrupt political establishment in the form of
Congress, “spending unprecedented amounts on an ‘advertising blitz,’” and attack-
ing the established media outlets, particularly English language ones. After Modi
came to power, the notion of fighting corrupt, impure, and spiritually malformed
elites in politics, economics, and society became a key component of the ascetic
celibate’s rhetoric.
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Modi also claims to be representing “the people.” Before elections in India’s most
populous state, Uttar Pradesh, in March 2017, he effectively told the people to vote
for his BJP—and let him choose their leader afterward.6 Responding to critics of
his decision to suddenly withdraw most of the currency in circulation in Novem-
ber 2016, he declared: “On one hand, there are these intellectuals who talk about
Harvard, and on the other, there is this son of a poor mother, who is trying to
change the economy of the country through hard work” (quoted in Rodrigues and
Pradhan 2017). A recent quantitative analysis of Modi’s and his predecessors’ Inde-
pendence Day speeches reveals that the peculiarity of Modi’s rhetoric lies in his
direct appeals to the audience. “Accordingly, words like ‘you,’ ‘brother,’ ‘sister,’
‘friend,’ ‘people,’ and ‘mother’ best define Modi’s language” (Jaffrelot and Martelli
2017)—and this “rhetorical technique is inherent in populism, a version of poli-
tics that crystallises when a leader tries to relate directly to ‘his’ nation” (Jaffrelot
and Martelli 2017). By contrast, references to India’s founding prime minister,
Jawaharlal Nehru—widely considered a symbol for India’s success as a multicultural
nation—were conspicuously absent at the most recent celebrations of India’s sev-
enty years of independence. Instead, the BJP’s general secretary, RamMadhav, used
the occasion to denounce Nehru for representing “the ideas that . . . were transmit-
ted by the colonisers from the west.” Whereas Nehru’s education in Cambridge and
London separated him from the people, today “[the] mob, humble people of the
country, are behind Modi. They are finally at ease with a government that looks and
sounds familiar. They are enjoying it” (Madhav 2017). Not unlike Indira Gandhi,
populist mobilization under Modi has also affected the way his own party works.
Consider that despite the BJP’s comparatively strong institutionalization, Modi’s au-
thority clearly and significantly supersedes party networks (Jaffrelot and Tillin 2017,
187); for instance, during the 2014 campaign senior BJP leader Advani was sidelined
and the campaign concentrated on Modi personally.7
Besides anti-elitism and Modi’s efforts to directly relate to “the people,” antiplu-
ralism and exclusionary identity politics have become increasingly visible in India
since 2014. The BJP is part of a group of Hindu nationalist organizations following
the doctrine of Hindutva, according to which Indian identity is to be equated with
the Hindu civilization and Hinduism (Jaffrelot 2017, 52–53)—to the detriment of
religious minority groups, primarily Muslims. Modi himself has a history of ambiva-
lent association with religious violence: the failure to prevent massive anti-Muslim
pogroms when he was chief minister of the state of Gujarat earned him a travel
ban to the United States in 2005. Religious polarization was an important element
in his subsequent election campaigns in Gujarat (Kenny 2017, 137; Jaffrelot and
Tillin 2017, 185). As prime minister, Modi has paid lip service to religious tolerance,
and the antipluralist discourse emerging in India has only rarely been openly pro-
moted by Modi himself but has been promoted by his surrogates, such as BJP party
chief Amit Shah and others (Kenny 2017, 139).8 High-ranking BJP politicians have
time and again promoted a majoritarian Hindu culture, be it by conducting elec-
toral campaigns with Hindu nationalist undertones, by calling for the declaration
of the Bhagavad Gita as India’s “national scripture,” or by renaming a street previ-
ously named after a Mughal emperor. Under Modi, Hindutva vigilante groups have
become increasingly open in their campaigns against cow slaughtering, religious
conversion, or an alleged “love-Jihad” by Muslim men trying to seduce Hindu girls.
6
The choice turned out to be Yogi Adityanath, a hardline Hindu nationalist priest known for his inflammatory
anti-Muslim rhetoric and actions.
7
As one national-level BJP Youth Wing functionary put it in an interview with one of the authors in 2015: “Modi’s
agenda is the BJP’s agenda.”
8
One notable exception is a statement during the election campaign in the state of Uttar Pradesh, where in early
2017 Modi hinted at an unjust privileging of Muslims to the detriment of Hindus on the part of the state (Verma 2017).
By contrast, former BJP Prime Minister Vajpayee (1998–2004), as well as his first minister of external affairs, Jaswant
Singh, are typically described as belonging to a “moderate” wing within the BJP.
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Several states passed legislation criminalizing the sale and the possession of beef or
hampering religious conversions and in July 2016 the BJP tabled a new citizenship
amendment bill in Parliament, which proposes easing the procedure for the acquisi-
tion of Indian citizenship for Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, and Christians
fleeing religious persecution in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh—thereby
explicitly excluding Muslim refugees and reflecting the BJP’s electoral promise to
make India “the natural home of persecuted Hindus around the world” (Medha
2016, 1). Antipluralism—even though not explicitly promoted by Modi as a national
leader but by prominent members of his party and by a host of organizations sur-
rounding it—is clearly an important component of Modi’s populism.
Hindu Nationalism and Populism
In order to gauge Modi’s populism’s effects on foreign policy, it is important to
differentiate between the BJP’s “thick” elements of ideology, including their rami-
fications for foreign policy, and populism’s combination of antipluralism and anti-
elitism.
The core of the BJP ideology is encapsulated in the term Hindutva. Its origins
can be found in writings by authors such as V. D. Savarkar, M. S. Golwalkar, and
Deendayal Upadhyaya, some of whom were heavily influenced by modernist na-
tionalist thinkers in the West (Hansen 1999, 77–89). Yet, Hindutva remains a fuzzy
concept, hard to pin down even according to its proponents (Hansen 1999, 77,
81). Besides a belief in Hinduism’s ancient glory, spiritual superiority, and univer-
sal mission, important elements found in its representatives’ writings as well as BJP
party rhetoric include a sense of Hindu victimization and fear of Muslims; a com-
mitment to “cleanliness,” social harmony, and natural authority; and a celebration
of (Hindu) masculinity. Of those, the stigmatization of (alien) Muslims and a corre-
sponding victimization of Hindus clearly dominates the public imaginary.9 A history
of violent partition along religious lines, the constant state of conflict vis-à-vis neigh-
boring Pakistan, the rise of Muslim political identities throughout the 1980s, and
India’s reservation policies benefitting minorities all contributed to the Hindu na-
tionalists’ consistent portrayal of majority Hindus as victims in their own lands. As
Jaffrelot puts it, “[this] strategy is the cornerstone of the Hindu nationalist move-
ment; it was the first to be formulated and sustains its ideology” (1996, 522).
Correspondingly, the “cleanliness” promised by the BJP (Hansen 1999, 221) and
other Hindu nationalist organizations ranges from saving Hinduism from impure
(Muslim and Christian) “infiltration” to the “protection” of Hindu women, fighting
corruption, and actually cleaning India’s (holy) rivers and public spaces. In foreign
policy, “[the] BJP dream of gaining for India global recognition and a rightful place
among the leading powers requires supplanting Gandhi-Nehru effeminate and non-
violent essentialism with images of Hindu masculinity and martial-endowments”
(Chaulia 2002, 220). The Vajpayee government’s decision to conduct five nuclear
tests in 1998, a long-standing BJP demand, can be attributed in part to Hindu na-
tionalists’ emphasis of muscularity and independence in international relations.
The understanding of Hinduism as a unique and morally superior civilization
based on ancient traditions and mythology informs a specific kind of Indian ex-
ceptionalism externally (Sullivan 2014; Nymalm and Plagemann 2018) and, as laid
out above, antipluralism domestically. On the other hand, the anti-elitism in our
conceptualization of populism does not come natural to the BJP’s “thick” ideology
of Hindutva. Indeed, the BJP traditionally relied on the support of upper castes,
a fact that has significantly limited the party’s electoral success pre-Modi (Jaffrelot
9
Based on extensive fieldwork in northern India, Hansen concludes that Hindutva ultimately amounted to the
“assertion of an extremely fuzzy Hinduness vis-à-vis a phantasmagoric construction of a Muslim threat” (Hansen 1999,
194).
292 Populism and Foreign Policy
1996). Albeit reverberating with Hindu nationalist thought, Modi enriched the BJP
agenda with new elements: anti-elitism, anti-corruption, and a focus on good gover-
nance for the “people.” This peculiar combination of anti-elitism and antipluralism,
which partially builds upon the “thick” Hindu nationalist ideology in defining the
“true” people, is what characterizes Modi’s populism.
Populism and Foreign Policy in India
In recent years, the issue of continuity and change in India’s foreign policy under
Prime Minister Modi has been the subject of much academic debate (e.g., Hall
2015; Chatterjee Miller and Sullivan de Estrada 2017; Ganguly 2017). Most studies
emphasize continuity in India’s foreign relations both on the regional and global
level—with the notable exception of the domestic foreign policy–making process
(see below). In this section, we will proceed to assess to what extent the features of
Modi’s populism play out in India’s foreign policy and if the shift from a nonpop-
ulist to a populist leader in 2014 led to the hypothesized changes in India’s foreign
policy.
Global Governance
Our first hypothesis suggested that populists might be less likely to make conces-
sions on global-governance issues that entail high costs of blood and treasure as
compared to nonpopulist governments. For the case of India, this hypothesis does
not find confirmation. In fact, few changes on global governance issues could be
observed between the Manmohan Singh and the Modi government—and, if there
was a shift, this was rather toward a more cooperative approach under Modi.
Indian governments have long paid attention to the potential costs and conse-
quences of public goods provision, which is hardly surprising given India’s char-
acter as a developmental state. In international trade negotiations, for example,
India has a consistent track record as a difficult actor, unwilling to compromise
(Narlikar 2011). Similarly, on climate governance, India has rejected binding emis-
sion targets, highlighting the historical responsibility of industrialized countries and
its own need to prioritize industrial development (MEA 2009). When it comes to
contributions in the field of security, India has a long tradition as one of the largest
suppliers of troops for UN peacekeeping operations, which have been an important
source of revenue but also a symbol of India’s commitment to the United Nations.
At the same time, after a phase of interventionism in the 1980s, India has become
extremely reluctant on issues of conflict management in its own region (Destradi
2014), and it has been highly ambivalent concerning the principle of the Responsi-
bility to Protect (Destradi 2017). All this predates Modi’s rise to power and reflects
India’s long-held prioritization of domestic developmental concerns and its com-
mitment to the norms of sovereignty and nonintervention, which are unrelated to
the shift toward populism. At the same time, contributing peacekeepers to UN mis-
sions has been hailed as reflecting India’s ethos as a “messenger of peace” by the
Prime Minister (Hindu 2017a) and India continues to be amongst the top three
contributors worldwide.
Interestingly, on specific topics such as climate change, Modi was rather more in-
clined to make concessions as compared to his predecessor: at the Paris conference
of 2015, Modi even tried “to present [himself] as a facilitator of the Paris agreement
[and] played a major role in pioneering a new agenda on renewable sources of en-
ergy” (Narlikar 2017, 104). The influential then foreign secretary Subrahmanyam
Jaishankar (2016) stated that “an aspiring leading power, at a minimum, needs to ex-
pand its global footprint.” He also mentioned Indian contributions to disaster relief
and humanitarian assistance, which “have had a resonance that is difficult to quan-
tify” and have “increased respect for India as a global citizen.” In regional security
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governance, the Modi government enthusiastically embraced the self-depiction of
India as a “net-security provider” within the Indian Ocean that had been devel-
oped under the previous government and includes, among others, Indian patrols
of some Indian Ocean island states’ exclusive economic zones (Scott 2015). Overall,
therefore, we see that a shift to a populist government has not led to a decreased
readiness on the part of India to contribute to global (and regional) public goods.
Bilateralism vs. Multilateralism
The Modi government has been notably active in terms of its bilateral diplomacy.
Between June 2014 and January 2018, the prime minister managed to go on sixty-
five visits abroad (MEA 2018), a remarkable number, with a focus on India’s wider
regional neighborhood. Modi’s public relations team also sought to underline his
close rapport with key leaders—from China’s Xi Jinping to Japan’s Shinzo Abe and
US Presidents Obama and Trump—and the centralization of foreign policy–making
procedures in New Delhi (see below) highlights the importance of such personal
ties. Yet, it is difficult to identify a clear trend in the prioritization of bilateralism
over multilateralism throughout 2014–18.
For one, abandoning international institutions is more easily done for a great
power like the United States than for less powerful countries such as India. In-
dia’s support for COP21 does not suggest abandoning multilateralism. Likewise,
in its engagement with the World Trade Organization, the current government by
and large mirrors the qualified engagement of previous administrations (Narlikar
2017). More tellingly perhaps, India’s official foreign policy rhetoric continues to
support the UN and its primacy in global politics. For that reason, support for the
G20 was as lukewarm under Modi as it was under his predecessor. Although an
ideal forum for displaying personal leadership and national weight, Modi not only
opposed the expansion of the G20’s agenda beyond crisis management but also ar-
gued that it should be subordinated to the UN’s sustainable development agenda
(Cooper and Farooq 2016, 96). At the same time, however, Modi has refrained from
reinvigorating New Delhi’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, a
longstanding desire consistent with India’s claim for a more prominent global role.
With the intention to extend its economic reach northward, India (together with
Pakistan) gained full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in
June 2017, building on efforts made by the previous government. India is amongst
the founding members of the Chinese-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank, with the second largest vote share, but vigorously opposes China’s Belt and
Road initiative for fear of Chinese intrusion into South Asia. India continues to be
an active participant within a variety of BRICS related interactions from the summit
level to the level of national security advisors and media or business conferences. In
fact, officials routinely describe the BRICS as the international format fitting most
closely with India’s aspirations and interests.10 Yet, such minilateral fora hardly de-
serve the label “multilateral.” Modi’s abstention from the Non-Aligned Movement’s
summit in 2016 was a break with the past, as Indian leaders not only were instrumen-
tal in the organization’s creation in 1956 but also remained outspoken supporters in
the decades since then. However, there are serious doubts about the organization’s
utility in a post–Cold War world. Moreover, historically, the BJP and its predecessors,
partly informed by anti-Soviet sentiments, had repeatedly expressed reservations vis-
à-vis the movement since the 1950s and, after the end of the Cold War, explicitly
stated that nonalignment had become irrelevant (Ghosh 2000, 339).
Regionally, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) re-
mains dysfunctional due to the dismal state of relations between Pakistan and In-
dia. As a response, India in 2016 sought to revive the Bay of Bengal Initiative for
10
E.g., Minister of State for External Affairs M. J. Akbar on September 15, 2017, at IDSA in New Delhi.
294 Populism and Foreign Policy
Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)—a forum com-
prising all South Asian states except Pakistan—by hosting its members in the con-
text of the BRICS Outreach Summit in Goa, and encouraged a more meaning-
ful Indian Ocean Rim Association; both diplomatic initiatives led some observers
to identify a “multilateral turn” in Indian Ocean affairs precipitated by the rise of
China (Mohan 2017). Overall, therefore, under Modi we can observe an intensifica-
tion of bilateral leader-level summits but without any clear trend toward a rejection
of multilateralism.
Transnational “People”
The third hypothesis concerns the idea of populist leaders extending the notion of
“the people” beyond their country’s borders. In the case of India, it is important to
distinguish between those understood as part of the “true people”—namely the In-
dian diaspora abroad—and the kind of ThirdWorld solidarity expressed by previous
Indian governments. In fact, whereas Nehru infamously refused any responsibility
for the well-being of people of Indian origin living abroad, describing India as a
developing country struggling within an inherently unfair international system was
one of the core elements of postindependence Indian foreign policy.
Under Modi, however, we have observed a weakening of these elements of the
Nehruvian foreign policy tradition and a tilt toward the “West.” His economic out-
look includes mercantilist elements as well as a belief in attracting foreign invest-
ment and expanding India’s immersion into global markets. Improving relations
with the United States already constituted a major priority under the Vajpayee gov-
ernment. In 2015, US President Obama was the “Chief Guest” to India’s Repub-
lic Day parade—a symbolic apex of India’s improved relationship with the United
States. Overall, Modi is much less willing than previous Indian prime ministers to
represent India as the leader of a marginalized and victimized community of the
Global South; rather, and again corresponding to the Hindu nationalist preference
for more assertive politics, Modi prefers to project an image of India as a great
power.
However, Modi’s vigorous pursuit of relating to Indian communities abroad
stands out. Although not entirely new—Hindu nationalist organizations began
reaching out to the Indian diaspora in the 1980s, the BJP government from 1998–
2003 pursued a similar strategy, and Congress maintained some of its innovations
(Jaffrelot and Therwath 2007, 293)—Modi’s interest in Indians abroad has been
remarkable. For instance, attending diaspora fora during foreign visits has be-
come obligatory. As prime minister, Modi addressed crowds of “Non Resident In-
dians” (NRI) from London’s Wembley Stadium with almost sixty thousand guests,
to New York (nineteen thousand), Singapore (eighteen thousand), and Shanghai
(five thousand). The prominence assigned to the diaspora in Modi’s foreign policy
was underlined by the introduction of a budget specifically designated for Indian
embassies to cultivate diaspora ties. While unifying the Indian “people” worldwide,
Modi has tried to harness this resource as a foreign policy tool. Reportedly, the Modi
government seeks to introduce voting rights for NRI (Haidar 2015). Indeed, in past
elections, the Indian diaspora has proven to be an asset both in terms of fundrais-
ing and “cyber support” to the BJP in particular (Jaffrelot and Therwath 2007).
Motivating investments by business people of Indian descent appears to be another
rationale. Furthermore, the Indian diaspora in some countries have emerged as im-
portant lobbies for closer ties, as most visibly in the United States. Less tangibly, in
their public pronouncements, Modi, as well as former Foreign Secretary Jaishankar,
habitually referred to Hinduism’s—and Indians’—presence across the entire Indo-
Pacific region and, from this, deduced a great power status for today’s India. In line
with populism’s anti-elitist component, the diaspora has been framed by Modi’s gov-
ernment as an “ambassador” of India, as for instance in Modi’s address to the first
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People of Indian Origin (PIO) Parliamentarian conference hosted by the MEA in
January 2018 in New Delhi (GOI 2018). A transnational understanding of the “peo-
ple” therefore seems to be a substantial element of innovation in Modi’s foreign
policy that directly relates to his populism.
Foreign Policy Actors
Changes to the actual foreign policy–making processes under Modi similarly reflect
the expectations derived from an understanding of populism as antipluralist and
anti-elitist. In fact, the centralization of decision making, which has been widely de-
scribed as key component of Modi’s tenure as chief minister in Gujarat, remains one
of his most remarkable characteristics (Jaffrelot and Tillin 2017, 187) and contrasts
sharply with his predecessor Manmohan Singh’s leadership style. Modi’s Prime Min-
ister’s Office, which includes the national security advisor (NSA), manages foreign
affairs directly through the foreign secretary, thereby circumventing External Af-
fairs Minister Sushma Swaraj. Besides NSA Ajit Doval and BJP party chief Ram
Madhav, prior to his retirement in January 2018 Foreign Secretary Jaishankar had
becomeModi’s chief foreign policy advisor and “personally handled all of Modi’s ex-
ternal engagements” (Katju 2018). At the same time, Swaraj’s visibility has been con-
fined to serving individual Indian citizens in (often trivial) distress abroad (in fact,
the external affairs minister visited far fewer capitals than the prime minister) 11
—to the effect that “the key levers of foreign policy choices are now located in the
Prime Minister’s Office and not in the Ministry of External Affairs” (Ganguly 2017,
142). Again, a comparison with the previous BJP-led government is instructive. Al-
though Vajpayee as PM, himself a former minister of external affairs, introduced the
position of the NSA and thereby contributed to the centralization within the PM’s
office, his minister of external affairs, Jaswant Singh, remained an important figure.
By contrast, since Modi took office, the MEA had to contend with learning about
the prime minister’s foreign visits after decisions had been taken; preparations for
important travels were made without consulting the MEA and often announced
via alternative (BJP-run) channels (Haidar 2016), and Modi has made it a habit to
greet foreign dignitaries personally upon arrival—a time-consuming affair but one
that resonates with his personalistic leadership style. According to some, all of this
has resulted in the constant ignorance of the MEA’s capacity and experience.12 The
erosion of foreign ministries’ authority over foreign policy making due to the pro-
liferation of foreign policy actors as well as a tighter control exercised by heads of
state has been observable across a variety of nation states, including India under PM
Singh. Yet, the extent of centralization under Modis is remarkable, not least since
the MEA has traditionally held a paramount position in Indian foreign policy, in-
cluding far reaching decision-making powers held by its senior officials. The MEA is
often seen as an institution particularly devoted to Nehruvian ideals in foreign pol-
icy; hence, whereas outflanking the MEA reflects both populism’s anti-elitism and
the populist leader’s desire for personal representation, the BJP’s thick ideology—
Hindutva’s opposition to Nehruvianism—works hand in hand with populism’s thin
ideology.
Interestingly, the downgrading of the MEA has primarily benefitted actors from
the security apparatus. Retired police officer and current national security advisor
Doval plays an “outsized role in making foreign and security policy” (Ganguly 2017,
142). In stark contrast to his immediate predecessor Shivshankar Menon, a former
foreign secretary (the MEA’s top position), Doval made his career in counter ter-
rorism operations and spent the latter part of it in high ranking positions within
11
Personal communication with diplomatic editors from four major Indian English language newspapers on June
2, 2017. Health issues may have played a role in Swaraj’s disinclination to foreign travels.
12
Personal communication in spring and summer 2017 with two anonymous Indian experts.
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the Intelligence Bureau, India’s domestic intelligence service. His role in bilateral
relations has grown since taking office to the extent that the NSA “himself runs ties
in special dialogues with the US, Pakistan, [the United Arab Emirates], China and
others” (Haidar 2016). Relations with Pakistan are particularly instructive. Not only
was engaging Pakistan on the NSA level a novelty, it also duplicated an ongoing
dialogue at the level of foreign secretaries. Foreign secretary talks that took place
eventually were then termed as “not official, simply a courtesy” by a government
spokesperson in parliament (Haidar 2016). Clearly, the weakening of the MEA—a
prime example for an elitist institution with traditionally extremely powerful offi-
cials determining foreign policy—is much in line with our hypothesis above. The
related centralization of decision making in foreign policy further confirms our
expectations.
New Forms of Communication and Involvement
Amongst the Modi government’s most striking characteristics is its employment of
social media and its circumvention—if not active obstruction—of traditional media
outlets such as newspapers and TV broadcasts.13 Modi himself has proven to be
exceptionally apt at adopting new technologies—from his active Twitter account to
3D holograms during election campaigns. Not only did this contrast starkly with
both his predecessor’s and his designated rival candidate’s public appearances, it
also helped in “reshaping his public image as a technology-savvy leader, aligned
with the aspirations of a new Indian modernity” (Pal 2015, 1).
Modi’s disdain for the press has been widely noted.14 He famously called journal-
ists “news traders” and a member of his cabinet introduced the term “presstitutes”
(Swain 2017). Instead of relying on the traditional media, his election campaign
employed social media and other novel means, such as 3D hologram technology,
to a degree and scale unprecedented. As prime minister, Modi has not addressed
a single press conference in India since taking office, agreed to interviews with do-
mestic media only in a handful of cases,15 and instead, explains his latest policies
in monthly radio addresses. Modi reportedly told his officials to avoid journalists,
which has severely restricted journalists’ access to official sources. As a result, his
“tweets have become the primary news source for Indian media” (Swain 2017). In
fact, avoiding direct interaction with the press does not mean absence from the pub-
lic sphere. Much to the contrary, Modi tweets, uses Facebook, has his own YouTube
channel, and is on Instagram. His “image is everywhere: on giant billboards trum-
peting new roads and bridges, in full-page newspaper spreads for BJP election cam-
paigns, in television spots touting myriad government programmes” (The Economist
2017).
Although more salient in domestic politics, this novel form of public relations has
had some repercussions for foreign policy and foreign policy reporting in particu-
lar. Modi ended the longstanding practice of journalists accompanying the prime
minister on his foreign visits. The MEA has become less accessible for India’s diplo-
matic editors. Meanwhile External Affairs Minister Swaraj was awarded a spot in
Foreign Policy’s list of global thinkers 2016 for “fashioning a novel brand of Twitter
diplomacy” (Foreign Policy 2016). And whereas Swaraj has been playing a minor role
in actual foreign policy making, Modi publicly applauded her social media outreach
for giving a “human face” to diplomacy: “If any Indian in distress tweets from any-
where in the world to the External Affairs Ministry, even at two in the night, within
13
Accounts on the intimidation of the free media in India under Modi have proliferated in recent years (e.g. The
Economist 2017). Anecdotal evidence suggests widespread self-censorship amongst journalists and academic researchers.
14
Personal communication with diplomatic editors from four major Indian English language newspapers on June
2, 2017.
15
However, he has been more accessible for the international media.
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15 minutes Sushma Swaraj replies to it, the government takes prompt action and
delivers results. This is good governance” (Hindu 2017b).
Populist Foreign Policy: Some Conclusions from the Analysis of the Case of India
This paper sought to develop a first answer to the question of whether there is any
such thing as a “populist” foreign policy. What our analysis revealed is that pop-
ulism does not seem to have much of an immediate impact on the “substance” of
foreign policy but that it certainly has important consequences for the “style” and
the processes of foreign-policy making.
Overall, being a thin-centered ideology, populism does not allow us to make pre-
dictions about specific foreign relationships or the more or less cooperative or con-
flictive character of a country’s bilateral relations with other states. If we want to un-
derstand potential elements of change in India’s relations with Pakistan or China,
for example, the combination of anti-elitism and antipluralism will not be a use-
ful analytical approach. On these issues, the underlying thick ideology of Hindu
nationalism and the BJP’s history of foreign policy thinking and action are more
helpful, for instance when it comes to explaining the current BJP government’s
more “muscular” approach toward China.
Conceptualizing populism as a thin ideology, however, allowed for the develop-
ment of some hypotheses on populists’ readiness to contribute to global public
goods provision and to engage in multilateral forums. Interestingly, both hypothe-
ses were disconfirmed in the Indian case. This is somewhat surprising, given, on the
one hand, the hostility toward international institutions and public good provision
often displayed by other populists in power and, on the other, India’s deep-seated
foreign policy tradition of prioritizing domestic development over foreign commit-
ments. The fact that India’s populist government has become rather more willing
to compromise on global governance issues, despite the costs of public goods pro-
vision, highlights that populists’ focus on the needs of “the people” in many cases
is primarily a rhetorical one. As Müller (2016, 30) puts it, “populists in power . . .
often adopt a kind of ‘caretaker’ attitude toward an essentially passive people,” and
this might be the case even more so in a field like foreign policy, which is generally
more distant from public scrutiny. Thus, on global governance issues, anti-elitism
and antipluralism have been of minor importance. India’s desire to be recognized
as a cooperative great power, and the concomitant expected status gains, seem to
weigh more than a promise to “the people” to refrain from costly international
commitments.
Interestingly, we could not find much support for the hypothesis concerning pop-
ulists’ skepticism vis-à-vis multilateral institutions either. This could indicate that
populists’ disregard for intermediary institutions above the nation state is depen-
dent on the degree of international authority a populist government is subjected to
or, in other words, to its enmeshment in the existing thick web of international in-
stitutions. Western populists often perceive international institutions as a limitation
to the sovereignty of countries that were and should be “great” on their own. Pop-
ulist parties across Europe are very critical of the EU’s authority in particular and
typically portray themselves as defenders of national sovereignty against a transna-
tional, elitist bureaucracy detached from the true people, elements of which also
appeared in Trump’s address to the UN General Assembly on September 19, 2017.
By contrast, non-European populists, given their countries’ more limited multilat-
eral engagements, will find it much more difficult to portray international insti-
tutions as a transnational, elitist project and a threat to stand up to. Support for
multilateralism may in some cases even dovetail with populists’ focus on sovereignty
if multilateral engagement can be shown to augment a developing country’s in-
ternational status. For example, attacking the UN’s authority would run counter to
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India’s desire for a more prominent global role.16 Our analysis, thus, suggests that in
the absence of meaningful integration in international organizations with a strong
supranational character, populists’ disregard for intermediary institutions may stop
at home. Given the “thin” character of populism, its impact seems to be filtered by
other, structural factors, such as a state’s position in the global political and eco-
nomic landscape. The interplay between populism and such structural factors will
need further scrutiny in future research on populist foreign policy.
One important finding for the case of India is the confirmation of our exploratory
hypothesis on populists’ construction (or rediscovery, in the Indian case) of a
“transnational people.” Diaspora politics have become a core component of Modi’s
foreign policy, and anecdotal evidence from Turkey suggests that this might not be
an isolated phenomenon. In future research, it will be worth exploring in greater
detail the impact of transnational populist mobilization, keeping in mind structural
differences across cases.
Our other core findings concern the impact of populists’ personalistic leader-
ship and communication style on foreign policy outcomes and foreign policy mak-
ing. The effects of such a centralization of decision making within a small group
of advisors—often not members of the traditional foreign policy elite—around the
populist leader will need more systematic analysis. As foreign ministries and their
bureaucracies have been established to guarantee continuity in countries’ foreign
policy across changing governments, populists’ circumventing and undermining
of such institutions could prefigure less predictable foreign policy trajectories. Al-
though difficult to verify, personalization can in fact be expected to eventually im-
pact upon foreign policy substance, even if the overall goals and professed interests
remain unchanged. For one, populist personalization will further incentivize for-
eign governments to establish a personal rapport on the leadership level, the success
of which is hardly predictable and thus increases uncertainty (witness Shinzo Abe,
Emanuel Macron, and other world leaders trying to establish a personal bond with
Donald Trump). Second, centralization with few decision-makers and the corre-
sponding need for prioritization may create bottle necks and thus eventually crowd
out issues and foreign relationships that are of only secondary importance to the
populist leader’s government. As a result, a populist’s foreign policy may become
less comprehensive and consistent in terms of both the effective pursuit of issues
globally and the cultivation of bilateral relationships, when compared to a non-
populist government. This would contrast, however, with the finding that populists’
anti-elitism and antipluralism do not necessarily seem to lead to specific changes in
the substance of foreign policy. Future research will need to cover longer time spans
in order to further theorize under what conditions structural factors and other im-
peratives will prevail and whether the seemingly erratic foreign-policy moves of pop-
ulists like Trump or Duterte are just a matter of style but ultimately do not lead to
substantial foreign-policy shifts.
Our analysis also has confirmed that populist leaders devise new formats to get in
touch directly with the people they claim to represent, including on foreign policy
issues. Further comparative analyses will need to be carried out to verify to what ex-
tent these are peculiarities of the Indian case, but initial evidence from other cases,
such as the US under Trump, suggest that these are broader trends. Obviously, these
issues also have a high degree of practical relevance when dealing with current and
future populists in power in different parts of the world. For instance, the marginal-
ization of traditional media outlets in the communication of a populist’s foreign
policy may reduce foreign actors’ very capacity of understanding (and predicting)
the respective government’s actions. And the almost exclusive use of direct commu-
nication via social media (and radio) aimed primarily at a domestic audience may
16
By contrast, Duterte called the UN high commissioner for human rights an “idiot” and threatened to “burn down
the U.N.” (Villamor 2016).
JOHANNES PLAGEMANN AND SANDRA DESTRADI 299
also have, eventually, repercussions for the actual foreign policy substance. That
could be the case once popular opinion and elite assessments on particular for-
eign policy issues diverge. One may safely presume that populists differ in terms
of whether they merely claim or truly seek to represent their people’s will. Yet, if
communication, however one-sided, with the leader’s support base is direct and
intermediaries (a country’s “strategic community”) tend to be circumvented, one
may indeed expect a stronger influence of the “popular” will and, in particular, of
the populist’s core support base, with relatively little regard for (or understanding
of) a country’s tradition of foreign policy thinking. In such cases, the popular in-
terpretation of a country’s interests as well as of the populist’s thick ideology may
overrule traditional foreign policy precepts or past practices.
Finally, responding to individual citizens’ distress abroad on social media, as
spearheaded by Minister of External Affairs Swaraj, not only “popularizes” but may
also (unnecessarily or not) politicize consular affairs and individual citizens’ fates,
with concrete effects on the bilateral relations of concerned states. Thus, due to
populists’ superior use of social media, we can expect an increase of cases in which
bilateral relations are taken hostage by individual citizens’ calamities abroad—be
they tourists, migrant workers, or businesspeople.
To conclude, while populism has a limited direct impact on the “substance” of for-
eign policy, its considerable impact on the processes and the style of foreign policy
making as well as on its communication can be expected to have substantive im-
plications in the longer term. Further comparative studies will need to assess those
implications and to apply our hypotheses to a broader range of cases of populists in
power.
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